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ABSTRACT 
 
 In my paper, I go back to Frantz Fanon as an important founding figure of 
postcolonial theory in order to argue for the relevance of paying more attention to the 
existential-phenomenological and humanistic elements of his thought. I situate Edward 
Said and Homi Bhabha as important theorists of discourse analysis, which I define as a 
linguistic and epistemological approach to the effects of colonialism on the colonized. I 
use Aimé Césaire’s poetry and thought as a framing device, and utilize Sylvia Wynter’s 
thought as a way of bridging discourse analysis with the existential-phenomenological 
side of Fanon in order to argue for an anticolonial humanism that locates the effects of 
and criticizes colonialism on the basis of the ontological question of the definition of 
what it means to be human. My research suggests that discourse analysis already finds 
itself in the midst of important ontological questions, but that these remain implicit to 
such an extent that they need to be more explicitly brought to the foreground. On the 
other hand, I argue that as Fanon radicalizes and renews various elements of European 
philosophy such as existential-phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and Marxism in order to 
more fully respond to a specifically anticolonial context, so does his work point towards a 
radicalized humanism that transcends the European context of that term. Ultimately, my 
thesis suggests that a Fanonian humanistic critique of colonialism points towards the 
creative, narrative based, and always-a-bit-more-than-contextual elements of human 
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Frantz Fanon’s thought has been and continues to be immensely influential in 
various branches of what is broadly conceived of as postcolonial studies. Though various 
aspects of his work have been seminal in the development of postcolonial theorizing, and 
though we are currently in the midst of a resurgence of scholarly interest in his work, 
there has not yet been sufficient attention paid to his call for an anticolonial form of 
humanism. Part of the reason for this is that certain areas of postcolonial theory need 
some tweaking and recalibration before they can fully engage with this call. In 
Colonialism/Postcolonialism, Ania Loomba argues that while postcolonial theory is 
extremely “heterogenous” and “riddled with contradictions” (5,32), we can still locate 
general currents of how postcolonial theorists have attempted to think through the 
implications of colonialism in politics, history, literature, and many other areas. She 
suggests that at the roots of postcolonial theory is a struggle to combine the liberatory 
historical analyses of Marxism with the nuance of poststructuralist concerns about 
language and the contingency of the human subject. She places Fanon’s relationship to 
this theory as merely one of attempting to stretch Marxism in order to account for race, 
an attempt that was later made in more nuanced ways by theorists like Homi Bhabha and
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Edward Said who engage with poststructuralist insights in their discourse analysis.1 This 
leaves out the important influence of existential-phenomenology2 on Fanon, and 
                                                
 
1 In tracing postcolonial theory from Marxism to discourse analysis, Loomba 
begins with Fanon’s complex relationship with Marxism. She then moves right through 
Gramsci to Althusser to Foucault and poststructuralism, leaving out both the existential- 
phenomenology and the existential forms of Marxism so important to Fanon. This does 
provide a good genealogy of Bhabha and Said, however, her definition of discourse 
analysis being that it “...makes it possible to trace connections between the visible and the 
hidden, the dominant and the marginalized, ideas and institutions. It allows us to see how 
power works, through language, literature, culture and the institutions which regulate our 
daily lives” (63). My engagement with discourse analysis in this paper mirrors (and owes 
an immense debt to) Alex Weheliye’s use of the critical resources of black studies to 
critique and expand the concepts of biopolitics and bare life in Foucault and Agamben in 
his extremely important and insightful Habeus Viscus. 
 
2 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines phenomenology as “the study 
of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. The 
central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward 
something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is directed 
toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) 
together with appropriate enabling conditions.” The method of the first official 
practitioner of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, is to bracket all other considerations 
other than intentional phenomena in order to attain a rigorous scientific knowledge of 
them, and in doing so posit a transcendental ego which constructs the world around it. 
The existential mode of phenomenology moves away from the early transcendental form 
in order to engage with lived experience and the impossibility of definitively separating 
being from knowing (Flynn 23, but cf. also the clear and insightful definitions of 
existential-phenomenology as well as other branches of phenomenology at 
http://www.phenomenologyonline.com/inquiry/orientations-in-
phenomenology/existential-phenomenology/).  Not all phenomenologists are 
existentialists, and not all existentialists are phenomenologists, but since figures that 
influenced Fanon like Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir, and Sartre were both, and because the 
intersection of these terms applies to Fanon’s project, I will maintain the use of 
existential-phenomenology throughout this paper. For all intents and purposes the way I 
use this term in the contexts of this study is covered well by Lewis Gordon in his 
Existentia Africana, when he says that existential thinking is not limited to Europe, but 
rather “...we can regard philosophies of existence...as philosophical questions premised 
upon concerns of freedom, anguish, responsibility, embodied agency, sociality, and 
liberation. Philosophies of existence are marked by a centering of what is often known as 
the situation of questioning or inquiry itself. Another term for situation is the lived 




specifically how he thought through the ontological question of the human in such a way 
as to prefigure and go beyond many of the later findings of the discourse analysts. 
Indeed, this account ignores how Fanon expanded upon not only Marxism but existential-
phenomenology in order to articulate the contours of an anticolonial humanism that can 
stretch out and radicalize discourse analysis in a manner that maintains both liberatory 
focus and theoretical rigor. A good way to address this occlusion is through the work of 
Jamaican writer and theorists Sylvia Wynter, who though at times is simplistically 
referred to as a poststructuralist herself, carries on the Fanonian existential 
phenomenological project of locating and resisting colonial definitions of the human. 
Both Fanon and Wynter are part of the vibrant Carribean intellectual history, which 
includes Fanon’s fellow Martiniquean Aimé Césaire, poet and thinker whose influence on 
Bhabha and Said but even more important influence on Fanon and Wynter casts a 
definitive shadow over this paper. Indeed, in his seminal work Discourse on Colonialism, 
Césaire sets the tone for anticolonialism when he observes that “at the very time when it 
most often mouths the word, the West has never been further from being able to live a 
true humanism – a humanism made to the measure of the world”(22). In other words, 
Europe has failed to live up to its own humanistic potential and its own projects. This 
indictment against European hypocrisy had a profound influence on Fanon’s project in 
which he locates the violence and racism of colonialism while arguing for maintaining a 
place for a radically altered humanism. Because Wynter continues this project in such an 
epistemologically rich way, Wynter is a crucial catalyst in bringing the ontological and 
ethical questions of the human (which, following her lead, I will refer to as “relational 
                                                
lived context of Africana peoples being-in-the-world is the question of value raised by 
the people who live that situation”(10). 
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ontology” in a way that includes ontology and ethics together) to bear on the 
epistemological and poststructuralist influenced theories of Bhabha and Said. The 
broadly construed existential-phenomenological problematic of being and knowing 
allows us to situate Fanonian humanism in the contexts of the interrelatedness of 
epistemology and relational ontology.3  
 In this paper, I first describe how Wynter engages with and goes beyond the 
radical Caribbean tradition to explicitly link epistemology to ontology in a way that 
productively allows Fanon’s combined ontological-epistemological project to engage the 
more epistemologically minded discourse analysis of Bhabha and Said. I use this 
framework to discuss three of Fanon’s major works; the roots of a new humanism 
                                                
 
3 Part of what makes Fanon and Wynter’s engagement with the idea of the human 
so capable of shifting the emphases of discourse analysis is the deeply linguistic nature of 
the way they define humanity. There is a great deal of theorizing in existential-
phenomenology as well as hermeneutics that informs the conception of the linguisticality 
of the human subject that is operating in my paper, but for reasons of space I must limit 
this specific discussion to a brief note. Heidegger, Sartre, and Gadamer among others talk 
about the human as essentially linguistic and semiotic in important ways. The clearest 
exposition of this position, which is related to my later discussion of contextualization of 
freedom (as well as my combined discussion of Césaire, Wynter, and Said), comes in 
Sartre’s Search for a Method, in which he says “Man[sic] is, for himself and for others, a 
signifying being, since one can never understand the slightest of his gestures without 
going beyond the pure present and explaining it by the future. Furthermore, he is a 
creator of signs to the degree that—always ahead of himself—he employs certain objects 
to designate other absent or future objects. But both operations are reduced to a pure and 
simple surpassing. To surpass present conditions toward their later change and to surpass 
the present object toward an absence are one and the same thing. Man constructs signs 
because in his very reality he is signifying; and he is signifying because he is a dialectical 
surpassing of all that is simply given. What we call freedom is the irreducibility of the 
cultural order to the natural order”(152).  For my purposes here suffice it to say that this 
linguisticality and narrativity of the human are European elements which Fanon and 
Wynter put to much fuller use in their radical appropriation of them in a colonial context, 
and that they give more concrete instantiation to how the freedom of the colonized is 




through a stretched radicalized reading of European philosophy in Black Skin, White 
Masks, the existential-phenomenological framing of emergent anticolonial humanism in 
A Dying Colonialism, and the full call for said humanism in The Wretched of the Earth. I 
devote most of the space to A Dying Colonialism because it is here that Fanon most 
concretely details how new beings and modes of knowing are struggled for and created in 
interlocking ways. I then discuss how both Bhabha and the early Said in different ways 
present the colonized as a passive recipient of the identity that colonial discourse forces 
upon them. I argue that an important way to understand what is lacking in both thinkers is 
that they discuss the processes and institutions of knowing without sufficient attention to 
the ontological and ethical issues that are also at stake. Part of the process of opening up 
discourse analysis to Fanonian humanism is showing the ways in which Bhabha’s 
appropriation of Fanon into his own analysis misses the political and historical 
importance of the latter’s thought, but that there are still places where Bhabha begins to 
open his thought to a more radical Fanonian reading. Through Wynter and Fanon, we can 
expand Bhabha to suggest that his formulation of colonial discourse as haunted by the 
contingencies of colonial reality needs to be open to how this haunting happens because 
of human agents struggling against colonial knowledge and the material power that 
upholds it. On similar grounds, we can deepen Said’s epistemological formulation of 
Western discourses about the Orient to flesh out the ontologically specific struggles for a 
full definition of humanity. Furthermore, Said’s own formulation of a non-Eurocentric 
humanism overlaps with Fanonian anticolonial humanism in a manner beneficial to them 
both, and in a way that allows me to defend both of them from charges of being 
historically regressive and redundantly banal. I combine Said and Wynter’s 
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interpretations of Césaire’s call for a nonprovincialist way of telling history and a “new 
science of the word” as a promising example of how Fanonian humanism can be 
articulated through new narratives that are sensitive to humans as dynamic and 
impossible to reduce to any abstraction. This transitions into my conclusion in which I tie 
together the threads of my argument with specific focus on how they are connected with 
Césaire’s poetic text Notebook of a Return to the Native Land, illustrating how his 
literary account of subject and community formation in the face of colonial history 
gestures towards how language and ontology are intimately linked. Freed from the 
corpse-begetting-corpse of colonial forms of knowledge and life, thought and narrative 
begin to point towards forms of life and knowing that lie beyond the borders and histories 
of structural violence. Breaking down the rigidities of colonial epistemologies in order to 
open up space for more truly ethical relations between humans brings with it the contours 
of new anticolonial epistemologies as well. Fanonian humanism responds to radically 
new contexts in radically new ways, not in a negation of history, but as a new perspective 
in terms of more relational and deeply rational modes of human existence.
  
  
WYNTER: COLONIAL MAN AND THE HUMAN SPECIES 
 Playwright, novelist, literary critic, and essayist, Sylvia Wynter is an immensely 
important theorist whose work has been influential in black studies, Africana and 
Caribbean studies, and amongst Latin American theorists of colonialism who work with 
the concept of the “coloniality of power.” While most of her voluminous writings appear 
scattered through various journals, the recent publication of the collection of essays 
Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis along with other recent theoretical works by 
scholars influenced by Wynter like Demonic Grounds, The Intimacies of Four 
Continents, and the above-mentioned Habeas Viscus are evidence of the current 
consolidation of interest in her work across various fields of thought. Her work has yet to 
receive the attention it deserves in other areas of postcolonial theory, however, and 
because she makes important epistemological engagements with Fanon’s thought and 
shows its direct relevance to the textualist analyses of Bhabha and Said, this can be 
shown to be a most unfortunate lacuna high past time for rectifying. As the title of 
collection of essays mentioned above indicates, the heart of Wynter’s theorizing is the 
idea that colonial disregard for the epistemologies of the colonizers is intimately linked 
with the valorization of a specific mode of being human, to the detriment of anything that 




overrepresented as the standard of being for the entire human race (262).4 This performs 
an epistemological blockage that has deadly systemic and existential results. The colonial 
system violently maps living people onto a discursive abstraction that is not even 
empirically attainable by those in power. It is certainly not attainable by the marginalized, 
whose heightened vulnerability and limited access to basic resources are naturalized by 
the constant maintenance of power in favor of the colonial definition of Man.  
 Furthermore, in dialogue with the radical tradition of Caribbean writers and 
thinkers that includes Césaire and Fanon,5 Wynter expands upon Fanon’s concept of 
sociogeny in order to theorize about new knowledge discourses that speak to the 
existential realities of humans rather than the ossified and ossifying discourses of 
coloniality. According to Fanon, while both “the history of an individual organism 
(ontogenesis) [and] the development at the level of species (phylogeny)” (Weheliye 25) 
are important, “there is also sociogeny....Society, unlike biochemical processes, does not 
escape human influence” and it is humans themselves that bring society into being 
                                                
 
4 Perhaps the most succinct summary of the Wynterian definition of “Man” is 
Weheliye’s: “I use Man to designate the modern, secular, and Western version of the  
human that differentiates full humans from not-quite-humans and nonhumans on the 
basis of biology and economics.”(139) 
 
5 Carole Boyce Davies’ comments on Caribbean thought are here extremely 
useful, “the creative/theoretical split, often assigned to writers in the Western canon, is 
perhaps less useful when we begin to evaluate some of the writers who come out of the 
Carribean region and whose ‘theoretical work is intimately connected to the imaginative.’ 
In addition to Sylvia Wynter… we can therefore automatically identify NourbeSe Phillip, 
Derek Walcott, George Lamming, C.L.R. James, Erna Brodber, Kamau Brathwaite, Aimé 
Césaire, and Edouard Glissant as some of the most recognizable black thinkers who 
enmesh the theoretical and the imaginative” (205). Wynter is part of a vast African 
diasporic dialogue that is engaged from a variety of angles in making sense out of how 
colonial modernity grew out of the horrendous violence perpetrated in the Caribbean 




(quoted in Weheliye 26). Wynter continues this project of thinking through the 
sociogenic principle by thinking the human against the ossified and ossifying discourses 
of Western coloniality. Her approach “differs markedly from arguments that seek to 
include the oppressed within the already existing strictures of liberal humanism or, 
conversely, abolish humanism because of its racio-colonial baggage” (Weheliye 25) and 
she provides her own account of how humans are “storytellingly chartered”(Wynter 28) 
beings that can create transcosmogonic narratives that expand the hegemonic we-referent 
of coloniality and articulate accounts of the human that are no longer shackled to the 
monohumanist (66) accounts that hold a discursive and institutional monopoly over 
humanity.6 Remembering what is at stake in the colonial definition of Man and the actual 
human species over and beyond it will allow us to return to the ontological question of 
the human in our discussions of Fanon, Bhabha, and Said.
                                                
 
6  It is worth citing in full the definition that Katherine McKittrick, the radical 
geographer and author of the important Demonic Grounds, gives of Wynter’s project: 
“The intellectual project of Sylvia Wynter is a vast rethinking of the ways in which the 
human is constituted. Wynter’s research draws attention to how the sociospatial 
expressions of Western modernity - colonial encounters during and after the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, the Copernican leap and the ascent of astronomy, physics, and 
physical geography, the secularization of Man and his human others within a Judeo-
Christian setting, territorial expansion and transatlantic slavery, industrialization, the rise 
of the biological sciences - accumulated and formed overlapping governing codes (Man1 
and Man2) as overrepresentations of the human. These governing codes produced 
racialized/non-European/nonwhite/New World/Indigenous/African peoples as first, fallen 
untrue Christians (in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) and, later, as biologically 
defective and damned (in the nineteenth century)” (143). 
 
  
FANON: BEING AND KNOWING AGAINST AND BEYOND COLONIALISM 
 With an emphasis on the interlinked nature of colonial epistemologies and 
ontologies in mind, we are able to read Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks in a manner that 
opens up space to analyze some of the shortcomings of discourse analysis style readings 
of Fanon initiated in large part by Bhabha, and also as a radical gesture towards grasping 
the lived historical experience of a victim of colonialism. Published in 1952, this difficult 
to categorize work of philosophical, political, psychiatric, historical, and autobiographical 
thought is a foundational classic of ethnic studies, critical race theory, and postcolonial 
studies among other areas that gives voice to the need for the creation of a new 
subjectivity beyond the violently imposed limitations of the colonial situation. Fanon 
declares that “in the world I am heading for, I am endlessly creating myself” (204), and 
stretches Marxism, psychoanalysis, and existential-phenomenology beyond their 
European roots in order to describe what is at stake in the individual subject’s creative 
resistance to colonialism, and the radical shift to relational ontology that needs to occur 
for people to transcend the brutality of colonialism.  
Though this account of the colonized subject is Fanon’s earliest publication, it 
already shows traces of a radically contextualized and historicizing humanism in its 
discussion of the black man’s attempt to find stable meaning in a racist colonial world 
that dehumanizes him at every turn. Fanon shows that the classical existential-
phenomenological account of subject formation is insufficient for making sense of the
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 uneven power dynamic that maintains in intersubjective relations in a colonial context. 
In the Sartrean account, a subject perceives “the Look” of an Other and in so doing learns 
that they exist in an external way for others such that their being is not merely a matter of 
individual choice. This is part of the process of subject formation when the subject learns 
of its own facticity through the experience of intersubjectivity in which subjects 
intermittently objectivize one another as parts of their projects, and are in turn 
objectivized as well (259-261). Fanon points out, however, that the colonized subject is 
not allowed to experience their body in the same way that white people are (Gordon 57). 
For the subject looked at by someone with whom they have a colonial dynamic, this 
intersubjective experience is saturated with histories and discourses of racism. When “the 
Look” happens in a racist colonial situation, it is far more violent and the objectivization 
far more stark and one-sided, as Fanon recalls being commented upon by a small white 
child who was afraid of him (89). Fanon refers to all the baggage that the encounter 
entails in the colonial situation, and says “the white man, who had woven me out of a 
thousand details, anecdotes, and stories” (91) casts the totality of racist assumptions about 
black people onto Fanon’s black skin. He has to deal with a degree of facticity that 
Sartre’s formulation does not account for. The weight of this colonial facticity destroys 
Fanon’s project for finding meaning. “I came into this world anxious to uncover the 
meaning of things, my soul desirous to be at the origin of the world, and here I am an 
object among other objects” (89). The standard phenomenological terms for 
intersubjectivity are insufficient to the context in which the colonized individual is 
considered a subhuman object. In other words, Fanon has historicized and politicized the 
12 
 
account of subject formation that has been erroneously presumed to stand on neutral 
ground.  
 Fanon’s engagement with insufficiently nuanced Hegelian-Marxist dialectic helps 
elaborate his point about the relationship between the individual subject’s relationship to 
history under colonialism, and how the struggle against coloniality is therefore the project 
to reinstate the colonized individual’s agency as a causal factor in history. At one point, 
Fanon criticizes Sartre’s preface “Black Orpheus,” written for Leopold Senghor’s 
collection of negritude poetry, for reducing an important moment in his own subject 
formation as a black man into merely a stage on the dialectical path towards postracial 
communism. Sartre notoriously described negritude poetry as “anti-racist racism” and 
rather paternalistically situated this as the antithesis to the colonial racism against which 
it would form the higher synthesis of world in which black and white working class 
members were indistinguishable from one another (Lee 15). Fanon says that Sartre 
“destroyed black impulsiveness” (113) through this gesture, and indeed we find the 
narrator weeping at the end of this chapter from the semantic violence committed against 
him. Fanon’s critique of Sartre is complex, but in contextualizing it against Sartre’s own 
philosophy, we find Fanon making a move against reductive systematizing (Prabhu 140) 
analogous to the very one Sartre would later attribute to Kierkegaard against the 
systematization of Hegel!  In Sartre’s later engagement with Kierkegaard in 
“Kierkegaard: The Singular Universal,” he describes the anguish that Kierkegaard felt at 
having his place as an individual already picked out beforehand in Hegel’s dialectical 
understanding of history. For Sartre, Kierkegaard rebelled against being reduced to 
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purely external/abstract knowledge, and in doing so expressed the “singular universal”7 
nature of the historical human subject (161). In “Black Orpheus,” however, Sartre 
reductively systematizes in a vulgar mode of Hegelianism indeed. It is not so much that 
Fanon finds this account to be completely false, but that the result of revolutionary black 
consciousness should be predicted ahead of times so simplistically by a European 
philosopher robs Fanon and other black subjects of their own agential relationship to 
history.8 From this comparison, we can illuminate and reformulate Fanon’s quarrel with 
reductive forms of the dialectic to suggest that as an individual, he himself is a historical 
absolute. He is a human subject who is intimately connected to the structural and 
historical contexts in which he finds himself, but his specific individuality cannot be 
reduced to these contexts. Though there are forms of cultural knowledge that can be 
                                                
 
7 The full quote, which employs the important term “historiality” that I do not 
explicitly use in my analysis, but that informs my discussion of the relationship between 
the colonized subject and history, is “Each of us, in our very historicity, escapes History  
to the extent that we make it. I myself am historical to the extent that others also make 
history and make me, but I am a transhistorical absolute by virtue of what I make of what 
they make of me, have made of me and will make of me in the future - that is, by virtue 
of my historiality”(24). Because Sartre sees the action which forms subjectivity as taking  
account of the specific contexts that one finds oneself in, he suggests that the act of 
subjectivity is the act of temporalization. Based on this point, Sartre makes his weighty 
claim that Kierkegaard escapes history because he is historical. Understanding that 
Kierkegaard rests upon the margins of knowledge is heuristically helpful in 
understanding that human subjectivity transcends what can be totally and systematically 
known. In a way that anticipates Derrida’s discussion of the supplement, and Lyotard’s 
idea of the differend, this Sartrean Kierkegaard becomes a symbol pointing towards the 
trans-historical and trans-semiotic nature of human freedom. 
 
8 The Kierkegaard connection has a deeper level as well. As Gordon points out 
“...the use of humor and the scale of metatextual critique - of the unusual relationship 
between of the author to his own text - is what differentiates Fanon’s work as something 
unseen before. Here one could even think of European existentialists such as Soren 
Kierkegaard, who used techniques of what he called ‘indirection,’ and Friedrich 
Nietzsche, who claimed to have been breaking idols, whose ideas and approaches also 
appear in Black Skin, White Masks”(166). 
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applied on a broader scale, there is a certain irreducible sense in which some knowledge 
can only be experienced singularly (Prabhu 133). We can refine our theorizing up to this 
point through posting a connection between Wynter’s humanity behind the concept of 
Man, and the Sartrean idea of the singular absolute. Colonialism denies that the colonized 
subject is the singular absolute, whereas Fanon’s struggle against the colonial situation 
illustrates that indeed the colonizers are active interpreters and agents of history.  
 Fanon argues for the need to move from a purely abstract epistemological 
encounter towards the situation where true ethical encounters can occur in conjunction 
with a deeper and more valid form of rationality. His project calls for escaping the 
colonial dynamic wherein he is simply interpelated an object by coming to the 
material/structural/historical contexts in which the existential process of creative self-
formation is actually allowed to take place. He says his ethical case against the colonial 
situation is that he has “the right to demand human behavior from the other human” and 
that “I show solidarity with humanity provided I can go one step further” (204). Going 
beyond the ontological and epistemological situation of colonialy structured human 
interrelatedness is the only way in which humans can really meet, and the only way that 
the realm of the ethical can even arise (Gordon 69). At the very end of his conclusion, he 
says “I, a man of color, want but one thing: May man never be instrumentalized. May the 
subjugation of man by man—that is to say, of me by another—cease. May I be allowed to 
discover and desire man wherever he may be” (206). Beyond colonial formulations lie 
the flesh and blood humans that desire to experience one another on equal grounds as 
humans. Lastly, he directs his call to a perpetually opening and dynamic definition of the 
human: “My final prayer: O my body, always make me a man who questions!” (206) and 
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in this phrase, links ontological and epistemological openness to the same overall project. 
He will later flesh out this project even more in his account of the decolonial struggle in 
Algeria.  
A Dying Colonialism was published in 1959, and though not as well-known as 
Black Skin, White Masks, or the later The Wretched of the Earth, is perhaps Fanon’s most 
concrete and specific study of the colonial situation and the struggle for a new humanity 
beyond it. This account of the last years of the Algerian war against French colonialism 
contains important examples of the radical human potential to counter and transcend the 
contexts, and in so doing giving the lie to reductive colonial discourses. Later on, I will 
refer back to Fanon’s thinking here to challenge Bhabha’s idea that colonial discourses 
break under their own weight through pointing out how Fanon’s account reveals how 
colonial discourses in fact break because the colonized actively resist and break them. 
The preface to this work declares that “men change at the same time that they change the 
world,”(30) which, notice, repeats the idea about the colonized subject “endlessly 
creating” himself as found in BSWM but expands it to include the interplay with the 
surrounding lifeworld as well. Likewise, it is here in A Dying Colonialism that Fanon 
extends his ideas about anticolonial ontologies and epistemologies to show that resistance 
to colonialism is a resistance to the rigid and oppressive colonial idea of the human.   
In the first chapter of this work, “Algeria Unveiled”, Fanon argues that the 
colonized reinterpret their own cultural symbols in a way that responds to the colonial 
situation, and in a way that the colonizer has a difficult time anticipating. Colonial forces 
depend on the knowledge that French sociologists had constructed in order to make sense 
of and control the Algerian people. According to this colonial knowledge, Algerian 
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society was essentially and rigidly matriarchal and could therefore be more easily 
controlled if the French could “conquer” the Algerian women9 by “finding” them beneath 
the veils they wore in much of Algerian society (37-38). The colonizers assumed that the 
process of seeing the Algerian women more clearly would be isomorphic with controlling 
them,10 and that therefore being behind the veil became an affront to French authority. 
Because they associated the veil with the assumed backwardness and inertness of 
Algerian culture, the French thought that unveiled Algerian women would then come to 
symbolize how colonialism had liberated Algerians to be able to take part in civilization. 
Thus, the affront to French authority was magnified into an affront to French-colonial 
culture. Fanon points out that in response to the colonial focus on the veil, the colonized 
themselves see its preservation as a crucial act of resistance against colonialism. The 
French reaction to this is key to understanding their ignorance of the Algerian ability to 
respond to their context, for they interpret the Algerian project to preserve their national 
culture as simply an element of long-standing religious fanaticism (41). In not seeing the 
Algerian refusal to relinquish the veil as a response to colonial coercion, the colonizer’s 
own role as a cause of the revolutionary effect is completely mystified to them. What is 
clearly a response to French rule is interpreted as a timeless essentialized irrationalism. 
Thus, the colonizers effectively bring what they see as Arab fanaticism into being 
                                                
 
9 There is an extensive engagement of Fanon’s thought in relation to feminism, 
much of which can be accessed in the essays and bibliography gathered in Frantz Fanon: 
Conflicts and Feminisms. Also, various “third world” and women of color feminists have 
addressed the interlocking yet distinct natures of anticolonial resistance and women’s 
liberation movements (Gordon 101).  
 
10 cf. Irigaray’s account of the scopophilic modus operandi of Western patriarchy 
in The Sex that is Not One.  
17 
 
through their own contingent efforts. Colonial science fails to even live up to its own 
putative standards of rigorous empiricism and rationality when it is created with the 
explicit bias of maintaining the colonial situation. Such a science is insufficient to capture 
the living appropriations and creations that the colonized make out of their specific 
contexts, and fumbles in front of the abstraction of Man behind which real people 
creatively resist. 
Expecting the colonized to simply correspond to the reductive knowledge that the 
colonizers presume of them, they are incapable of grasping how the Algerians are able to 
take stock of their situation and actively struggle to alter it. Continuing in the chapter, 
Fanon recounts how Algerian women specifically had to overcome the structured inertia 
of colonial knowledge in order to fight back for liberation. According to Fanon, the 
image of the colonizer is lodged within the very body of the colonized to the extent that 
she has been indoctrinated by colonial ideology to see her place in a subjected way, yet 
she “devalidates” it and transcends it towards resistance. Through the process of 
resistance, many women become “bearers of complex messages” acting as crucial 
avenues of communication between different groups of rebels (53). Furthermore, she 
relearns how to situate her body in relation to how it is coded by the enemy, and in a 
“dialectic of body and world,” she is able to pass by French surveillance and to take part 
in activities not expected by them (59). Since “colonialism wants everything to come 
from it” and the colonized are actively producing their own oppositional meanings and 
actions, “the colonialists are incapable of grasping the motivations of the colonized” (63). 
Indeed, the colonizer is haunted by the fact that they do not truly know the colonized, and 
this is partly because the colonized is capable of grasping their situation and going 
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beyond it in a way that the colonizer cannot even fathom. The epistemological system 
through which the colonizer expected to locate the colonized is revealed to be inadequate 
to address to supposed objects of knowledge.  
 The Algerian appropriation of heretofore-enemy signs and tools is that the French 
struggle slowly to even comprehend, and have an even harder time quelling. This 
breakdown of colonial knowledge into anticolonial knowledge is an important aspects of 
the Algerians’ process of redefining themselves. In chapter 2, “This is the Voice of 
Algeria,” Fanon discusses the ways in which the radio and the French language were 
given new revolutionary meaning by the people of Algeria, and that they became 
different people as they creatively and radically responded to their contexts. Initially, the 
process of transmission of information over French radio airwaves was something that 
the majority of Algerians did not choose to take part in. It was a world of signs that they 
recognized as not directed towards them, so they did not participate (73). One of the first 
mistakes that the French made on this front was giving out information about events in 
relation to the Algerian struggle against the French army in order to try to spread 
intimidation. Hearing the colonial account of events, some Algerians were made privy to 
the existence of rebel groups and locations that they hadn’t previously been aware of, but 
they also realized that they needed information of their own if they were to resist French 
manipulation (75).  French discourse on the war therefore did not simply dissolve under 
its own weight, but was rather actively taken and used against the intentions of the 
colonizers. After the Algerians began to openly resist through the avenue of radios, the 
French discourse was not able to stand on its own. In this new context of constant 
contestation from the narratives of the Algerians themselves, the colonial discourse 
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“avowed its own uneasiness” and was more easily detectable as a contingent production 
of the colonial project of maintaining power (76).  
 Algerians increasingly began to get more radios, and some began transmissions to 
spread information about the revolutionary war from the Algerian perspective. The 
airwaves were jammed by French forces in such a way that only fragments of information 
came through. Out of these fragments, the Algerian listeners crafted their own complete 
narratives, taking the pieces available to them and creating “epics of liberation” that 
projected the desire to revolutionary victory into narrative (86, 89). The Algerians 
broadcast news to one another not through Arabic or any of the other native languages of 
Algeria, but in the very language of the colonizers. In a sense, they liberated the enemy 
language and made it serve the project of anticolonial liberation against its own previous 
masters (90). The colonizer in this context finds not merely a voice echoed back strangely 
at him, but a completely different and inimical voice countering his project with its own. 
Instead of appreciating the innovative ways in which the Algerian has grasped the French 
language against the colonial project, however, the colonizer can only remark that this 
reveals the inertia and uselessness of the Arabic language. Even the blatant capability of 
the Algerians to resist is interpreted as an obvious sign of their essential inertia (91). With 
a heightened network of communication, the revolutionary anticolonial forces continue to 
gain considerable victories against the French. As Fanon says, “words shape the world,” 
(95) and new narrative interpretations of Algeria arise to shape the area in new ways. 
Indeed, the establishment of what one scholar has termed “wireless democracy” was the 
Algerians hard-fought articulation of new narratives of relations amongst themselves and 
the land in the emergent form of a new democratic society (Gibson 57). In keeping with 
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Wynter’s description of colonialism as the “corporatization of zones” in which spaces are 
interpreted as indicative of the essential natures of the bodies that inhabit them (Ansfield 
130), the active anticolonial struggle of the Algerians gives the lie to the essentialism that 
had been foisted onto their land and onto their bodies through showing that they are the 
storytelling creators of themselves and their relationship with their own spatial contexts. 
To appropriate the discourse of the colonizer is to forcefully declare that one is human, 
and as signifying beings, humans create history. The strategic uses of radio and French 
helped the Algerians recreate the world and themselves in such a way as to challenge the 
colonial system of power.  
 The complex relationship between newness and historical context linked to the 
process of articulating a humanity beyond colonialism comes into play clearly in Fanon’s 
discussion of the adaptations in Algerian family dynamics that occurred during the 
anticolonial revolution in chapter 3, “The Algerian Family.” Against the layers of 
repression that she faces, the female Algerian subject reshapes herself and creates a new 
subjectivity as well as a new shape to the material world around her. Fanon argues that 
the woman in Algerian society responds to the colonial context with a creative resistance, 
and that “She literally forged a new place for herself by her sheer strength” (109). In this 
case, she was neither granted freedom by the patriarchal elements of Algerian society, 
nor did she simply appropriate liberal European concepts of individual agency as liberal 
apologists for Western imperialism argue even to this day in narratives of Western 
feminism needing to “rescue”11 Middle Eastern women from their supposed 
                                                
 
11 As for the patriarchal elements in Algerian society, “As the Algerian feminist writer 
Assia Djebar has argued, alongside the ‘progressive enclosing of outside space,’ which 
began with the colonial intrusion, came ‘a progressively silent freezing of internal  
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“backwardness.” This radical gesture of freedom reshaped the world into a form that was 
theretofore nonexistent. In a radically new context, the Algerian woman’s creativity leads 
to the world being shaped in a new and different way. The human is that which cannot be 
reduced to its place in knowledge discourses or history, but transcends these in such a 
way as to refashion them (Gibson 52). This eruption of new human freedom into the 
world accompanies a radical shift in human ontology as well as the epistemological ways 
in which human subjects discern themselves and the places around them. Through the 
force of their thinking actions, the Algerians illustrate the bankruptcy of the colonial 
definition of Man and the oppressive and violent situation that undergirds it.    
 Fanon gathers the threads found in his previous works that address the need to go 
beyond colonial modes of being and knowing in a call to definitively articulate the human 
in a way that breaks and abandons the structures of coloniality in his last book, The 
Wretched of the Earth. Published in 1961, and certainly both his most controversial yet 
influential work, this text is the culmination of Fanon’s attempts to use various strands of 
thought and analysis to understand the anticolonial struggles to which he himself 
dedicated so much effort. After having covered such topics as the place of violence in 
                                                
 
communication . . . between the sexes.’ In the twentieth century, as native society was 
dispossessed of its lands, its ‘tribal structures began to turn inward [and] close in on 
itself.’ Women were ‘doubly imprisoned.’ The constriction of space was manifested in 
the tightening of relations within the family. Often it meant disinheriting women in favor  
of men” (Gibson 50).  So we are already on the complex ground that even those elements 
of Algerian patriarchy were certainly aggravated by the colonial situation. This has been 
lost on generations of commentators that have used the language of feminism as an 
apology for imperialist aggression, such as recently the liberal feminist justifications for 
the US invasion of Afghanistan in order to “liberate” the women there. For more 
contemporary narratives of Western imperialist feminism in relation to Islam in 
particular, cf. “Imperialist Feminism and Liberalism” by Deepa Kumar, which describes 




anticolonial revolution, the strengths and weaknesses of both spontaneity and nationalist 
organizations, and the importance of not allowing revolutionary consciousness ossify into 
repressive versions of the postcolonial state, he declares that to truly recover from the 
panoply of traumas wrought against the colonized, it is not enough to merely cast off the 
governmental shell of colonial rule. As to the direction that people should take after 
kicking the European rulers out of their countries, he says, “Let us decide not to imitate 
Europe and let us tense our muscles and our brains in a new direction. Let us endeavor to 
invent man in full, something which Europe has been incapable of achieving” (236). Part 
of the grotesque European heritage that must be resisted is that the reality of the human 
has been “replaced by words”(237), that living human beings have been covered up in 
dead colonial narratives. Europeans (and their monstrous neo-colonial children, North 
Americans)  see only the violently constructed abstractions that they have engendered in 
order to keep their power intact, but narcissistically assume that these abstractions are 
proof of their own objective superiority. The new humanism is not merely dead 
abstraction, but includes contextualized praxis as well (Bernasconi 115). Furthermore, 
this new anticolonial humanism is not to the benefit of the victims of colonialism alone, 
but for all of humanity (239). Thus, Fanon calls for a humanism that breaks through the 
artificial boundaries that violently divide the human species. This is not the liberal 
pollyanna postrace utopianism that declares that colonialism will be solved through the 
pretense of colorblindness, but rather a call to rigorously think and act through the results 
of colonialism in order to philosophically and materially destroy them. In my following 
treatments of Bhabha and Said, I will expand upon how this anticolonial humanism 
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shows that behind the linguistic and epistemological concerns of discourse analysis lies 
the articulations of a new human mode of being beyond the structures of colonialism.
  
  
THE HUMAN HAUNTING BHABHA’S DISCOURSE 
In contrast to my reading of Fanon as outlined above, Homi Bhabha, in the essay 
“Interrogating Identity” in his seminal Location of Culture, is to a great extent 
responsible for the discourse analysis reading of Fanonian thinking. The interpretation of 
Black Skin, White Masks in particular is insufficiently attuned to the importance of the 
historical situation of colonialism to see the diachronic contexts of Fanon’s theorizing, 
and collapses his account into a synchronic negotiation of identity rather than a struggle 
against the conditions of colonialism themselves (Prabhu 125). These hermeneutic 
insufficiencies in Bhabha’s account in large part manifest themselves on the sustained 
focus that he places on ambivalence and undecidability. I argue that Bhabha not only 
does not see the full implications of Fanon’s existential-phenomenological and historico-
political methods of theorizing, but when he does see them for what they are, he does not 
adequately appreciate their value. 
One of the central issues in Bhabha’s reading is that it misses the specifics of how 
Fanon contextualizes his thought. Certainly, Bhabha is correct to point out that under 
colonial conditions and resistance to them, social and psychic representations of Man are 
disturbed (59); however, his account remains immobilized at the level of psychological 
and linguistic disturbance. The assertion that Fanon is “not posing the ontological 
question” (61) prevents Bhabha from seeing how close his own account is to venturing 
into the realm of human ontology. Indeed, taken by itself, the idea of a disturbance in the
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“psychic representation of Man” sounds quite Wynterian, as does his suggestion that “the 
encounter with identity exceeds the frame of the image,” (71) but Bhabha does not 
concretely link these insights to human beings struggling behind knowledge discourses 
that they are not reducible to.12 Therefore, his account of how people attempt to fix 
cultural difference into visible objects (72) could be put to insightful use as to how 
perceived culture is naturalized under colonialism, but his account remains at the level of 
the decontextualized reader attempting to fix cultural codes in a comprehensible way. 
Because Bhabha does not fully appreciate how Fanon has transcended and 
radicalized phenomenology, he occludes from his account the corporeal and material 
elements that lurk behind his discourse. His penchant for finding semiotic ambivalence in 
Fanon leads him to bring up the Lacanian gaze (80) without any mention of the 
existential-phenomenological account of the Look that we discussed above. There are 
certain elements of Fanon’s project that cannot be occluded, however, and to these, 
Bhabha claims that Fanon strays from his own best insights. Bhabha’s take on Fanon’s 
call for liberation, for instance, is that it is un-nuanced and fundamentally linked with 
nostalgia (76). This is quite a haphazard reading, however, when Fanon explicitly places 
his call for liberation with warnings against the potential lapse into a mystified nostalgia 
for the past. In a remarkable passage, Bhabha suggests that  
                                                
 
12 Bhabha also speaks of liminality, but in his account, this is related to 
epistemological concerns and not ontology. Furthermore, Bhabha’s understanding of the 
textuality of identity (77) contains a great deal of valuable theorizing, but the manner of 
textuality of which he speaks is limited to the aporetic poststructuralist play of signifiers. 
Textuality as understood in a more Wynterian vein points towards narrative openness and 
a creativity that is irreducible to any single discourse, rather than the synchronic 
ambivalence and indeterminacy of Bhabha’s account.  
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Restoring the dream to its proper political time and cultural space can, at times, 
blunt the edge of Fanon’s brilliant illustrations of the complexity of the psychic 
projections in the pathological colonial relation. (86) 
 In other words, Fanon’s nuanced theorizing is spoiled when he historicizes and 
politicizes its implications. Of course the interplay of signs is more baroque when not 
linked to a specific context we might protest, but Bhabha goes on to say of Fanon’s 
concluding wish to enter into authentic intersubjective relations with others that  
It is as if the question of desire that emerged from the traumatic tradition of the 
oppressed has to be modified, at the end...to make way for an existentialist 
humanism that is as banal as it is beatific. (87) 
 Bhabha sees Fanon’s call for an opening of the boundaries of the human as nothing but a 
silly deviation from his psychoanalytic theorizing. Remembering, however, that Fanon 
declares that liberation from alienation only comes when material conditions are set right, 
and that since the existential plight of the colonized individual is in large part the 
epidermalization of economic injustice, the solution lies in overcoming the colonial 
situation (xv). Bhabha’s reading of Fanon remains trapped in those colonial conditions13 
that remain in large part unthought in his discourse analysis account. 
Bhabha does seem much more appreciative of the phenomenological and political 
aspects of Fanon’s work in his foreword to The Wretched of the Earth, however, 
indicating that there are elements of his thought that engagement with Fanonian 
humanism can deepen and improve upon. He says that Fanon’s thinking allows us to 
think a genealogy of globalization (xv) that traces settler colonial Manichaeism to the 
                                                
 
13 Furthermore, taking into account Bhabha’s argument that colonialism collapses 
temporality and spatiality, his temporality-phobic take on Fanon thus chides him for 




globalized dual economy of our times (xii). His argument that Fanon offers a way of 
finding a “new humanity” past the limitations and parameters of the cold war (xvii) is 
quite suggestive. Here he opens up space to think of the human as that which does not 
correspond exactly to any of the major political narratives that surround it. Surprisingly, 
we find Bhabha saying that one of the values of Fanon’s text is that it provides a way to 
go beyond “the politics of identity, and the politics of recognition” (xviii). The colonial 
gaze is insufficient to define the lived reality of the colonized. This already goes beyond 
the discursive account in Location of Culture that I discuss below to gesture towards a 
more human realm of the material struggle. As opposed to the Bhabha that occludes the 
phenomenological aspects of Fanon’s work in Black Skin, White Masks, this iteration 
argues for the value of the “phenomenological approach to colonialism” (xxii) and even 
ties this in with the issue of agency (xix). Though he says he disagrees with Hannah 
Arendt’s reading that Fanon presents a teleological prophecy that violence will usher in a 
new era of humanity,14 his own reading seems infected by this obsession with violence, 
                                                
 
14 Arendt’s reading in On Violence remains the standard liberal mythification and 
reduction of Fanon to a “prophet of violence,” propelling confused and angst-ridden 
youngsters to react violently instead of critically to their situations. Leaving aside the 
racist discourses that invariably couch antiracist projects as simple irrational overflows of 
emotions, this reading rests on an interpretation of Fanon that, as Gordon points out, 
leaves one wondering if the critics have even read the Fanon’s work itself or have just 
looked at decontextualized quotes (10). This mindset today is represented by a liberal  
political scholar and Africanist such as Alex de Waal, who asserts that Fanon’s work is 
“often opaque and his methodology confused” and that this leads to him being 
appropriated in such radically different contexts (29). That Hutu nationalists made use of 
some passages in their genocidal violence in Rwanda is for De Waal a clear smoking gun 
that Fanon’s thought is irresponsible and dangerous (incidentally leftists and 
antiimperialists are currently familiar with this kind of thinking in attempts to discredit 
Noam Chomsky’s critiques of American imperialism through pointing out that his work 
was quoted by Osama Bin Laden). Critics who dogmatically call for pacifism and 




leading to some passages sounding as though he needs to rescue Fanon’s unwieldy 
account from going over into the edge. That being said, Bhabha does preserve a rather 
compelling kernel of Fanon’s thoughts on knowledge and choice, however, and his 
reading repeatedly returns to Fanon’s idea that “Each generation must discover its 
mission, fulfill it or betray it, in relative opacity.” His interpretation is that the political 
urgencies of our contexts must be attended to even though we are forced to choose 
without pregiven knowledge (xvi), an account that of course is strikingly similar to the 
existentialist formulation of responsibility so prevalent throughout Fanon. I will now 
show how elements of Fanonian thought at the peripheries of Bhabha’s account of Fanon 
himself can be used to stretch out other important areas of Bhabha’s oeuvre. 
Bhabha provides a compelling account of the fissures in colonial discourse and 
their relation to epistemology, but one that needs to be deepened according to the 
embodied agency of the colonized. In “Signs Taken for Wonders” in his Location of 
Culture, Bhabha argues that the colonizer’s discourse of universality ends up being 
haunted by the contingency of the colonial situation, and that the place of enunciation of 
colonial discourse reveals that it is itself not transcendent and unmediated, but a 
contingent assertion of power. At one point, he describes the result of trying to force 
certain people and discourses into the colonial grid of knowledge as “the articulation of 
the ambivalent space where the rite of power is enacted on the site of desire” (Bhabha 
                                                
 
presenting anticolonial resistance as somehow arising from a vacuum and not responding 
to the brutalities of the colonial situation. Furthermore, that Fanon’s nuanced  
critique of the dangers of revolutionary thinking devolving into oppressive brutality is 
actually a useful tool in critiquing the rise of Hutu Power in Rwanda is completely lost on  
those who would want to lump violence against the colonial geopolitical status quo with 
all violence whatsoever.   
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160). In other words, there are spaces and events that reveal that colonial discourse is a 
contingent product of colonial desire rather than an unmediated fount of universal truth. 
He argues this through pointing out the ways in which the original British missionaries in 
India were troubled by questions that local people asked about the relationship of 
Christian theology to certain aspects of Indian traditions. In this context, the colonizers 
quickly lose patience for what they consider to be the constant calling into question of 
themselves and the Bible as immediate sources of authority. Through the “strange 
questions” that the locals put to the missionaries about the connections between Christian 
rites and cannibalism, the colonizers begin to become worried that the status of what they 
have taught to the colonized has not been accepted as the pure truth in the way that was 
hoped (166-168). At that very point of trying to convince the Indian questioners of the 
pure veracity of the colonial knowledge of Christianity, the missionaries perform the very 
fact that their authority must be contingently stated and brought into being through their 
own rhetorical efforts. Thus, putatively universalist colonial discourse is haunted by the 
fact that it fails to live up to its own standards, and ends up buckling under its own weight 
to show areas of fissure and indeterminacy. For Bhabha, the new understanding of 
Christianity in parts of India that has resulted from failure of the colonial discourse of the 
transcendentally true nature of Christian theology suggests that colonial knowledge 
cannot survive its transplantation to another location without suffering mutations in the 
process. 
Bringing a Fanonian and Wynterian lens to bear on Bhabha’s formulation of 
haunted colonial discourse points out that while Bhabha presents the image of a colonial 
grid of knowledge that wobbles and cracks under its own impossible weight, he leaves 
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out how this grid was broken because it covered over humans who did. Our extensive 
discussion of Fanon’s theorizing on the Algerian resistance above provides various 
examples of how the colonized are not merely passive recipients of colonial structures, 
but re-appropriate and challenge those structures through their own anticolonial struggles. 
On this reading, those who put difficult questions to the Christian missionaries weren’t 
just interrogating the book, they were asserting their own system of meaning and 
enveloping the colonial English sign into their own contexts. This indeed creates 
ambiguous meaning as Bhabha so well points out, yet also leads to a greater amount of 
Indian autonomy as the Indians assert their humanity against the dehumanizing forces of 
colonialism. 
Some of the hints at a fuller human ontology that we locate in Bhabha’s 
introduction above can be found in his chapter “How Newness Enters the World,” in 
which he suggests that migratory subjectivity in the contemporary world leads to a 
subject formation that finds itself situated in the between spaces of different discourses 
and temporalities in a way analogous to the process of translation. Indeed, his famous 
theorization of the third space can from a Wynter-Fanonian perspective be stretched in 
order to articulate how the new postcolonial human defines itself beyond the hegemonic 
parameters of Man.  Bhabha says that for migrant individuals,  
What is at issue is the performative nature of differential identities: the regulation 
and negotiation of those spaces that are continually, contingently, ‘opening’, 
remaking the boundaries, exposing the limits of any claim to a singular or 
autonomous sign of difference...It is, if I may stretch a point, an interstitial future, 
that emerges in-between the claims of the past and the needs of the present. (313)  
This subjectivity is always shifting its boundaries in a way that cannot be tied down to the 
past, present, or future, but comes from an ever-changing negotiation of all three. The 
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new future arises not simply out of connections with what has come before, nor out of a 
completely synchronic relationship with the present.  Bhabha says that 
To dream not of the past or present, nor the continuous present; it is not the 
nostalgic dream of tradition, nor the Utopian dream of modern progress; it is the 
dream of translation as ‘survival’ as Derrida translate the ‘time’ of Benjamin’s 
concept of of the afterlife of translation, as sur-vivre, the act of living on the 
borderlines. (324)  
What is left over after all the knowledge discourses have been exhausted is the human 
species that was never reducible to any of them.  Humans are linguistic and narrative 
beings, and in order to have somewhat valid knowledge of them, that knowledge must 
itself be of a narrative nature that mirrors its object. This anticolonial humanism can be 
described well by how Bhabha says that 
The ‘newness’ of migrant or minority discourse has to be discovered in medias 
res: a newness that is not part of the ‘progressivist’ division between past and 
present, or the archaic and the modern; nor is it a ‘newness’ that can be contained 
in the mimesis of ‘original and copy.’ (325) 
 Furthermore, 
The foreign element ‘destroys the original’s structures of reference and sense 
communication as well’ not simply by negating it but by negotiating the 
disjunction in which successive cultural temporalities are ‘preserved in the work 
of history and at the same time cancelled.’ (326)  
The humanism that we have begun to speak of in terms of Fanon, and which we will now 
discuss in terms of Said, does not merely stem from past European humanisms, but in its 
anticolonial positioning, destroys the past structures of humanism in order to open space 
for thinking the human species on new ground. This posited new humanity ends up 
looking strikingly similar to Fanon’s in Black Skin, White Masks of which Bhabha has 
ironically been so dismissive.
  
   
SAID: FROM DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TO ANTICOLONIAL HUMANISM 
 According to many accounts, the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism in 
1978 inaugurates the academic field of postcolonial studies as understood today. 
Whatever the case, this text is certainly foundational to discourse studies specifically, and 
so while Bhabha is at the root of the discourse analysis interpretation of Fanon 
specifically, Said is at the root of discourse analysis more generally. I look briefly at 
Orientalism as making somewhat similar moves to Bhabha’s “Signs Taken for Wonders” 
discussed above in terms of a focus on linguistics and epistemology that needs to be 
stretched and deepened through ontology and ethics, before showing how in his later 
more historico-political work as well as his move towards humanism that his project 
overlaps with Wynter and Fanon’s but in a uniquely epistemologically inflected way. 
Indeed, the new humanism that grows out of Said’s paradoxical repudiation of much of 
the discourse analysis methods that he himself help found provides another good means 
by which to bring such analysis into deeper dialogue with Wynterian and Fanonian 
modes of humanism.   
 For the Said of Orientalism, Western knowledge production concerning “the 
East” is intimately interlinked with the process of Western domination. Hearkening to 
Foucault’s idea that knowledge discourses are imbricated in the power structures that 
give rise to them (3), Said argues that Western forces have created a purely abstract 
notion of “the Orient” that corresponds to its own colonial desires. It is not the case, as
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many of his harsher critics have asserted, that Said simply presents Eastern identities as 
mere projections of Western knowledge and therefore denies them any agency of their 
own. The issue is more nuanced than that, for in Said’s account, Eastern people certainly 
have their own histories and truths, but the Western discourses themselves have zero 
relations to these realities. This account, much like that of Bhabha in relation to hybrid 
discourse above, does not address how Western discourses themselves were shaped by 
the active resistance against them. Said’s account is perhaps even more problematic than 
Bhabha’s in some ways, however, because while Bhabha at least acknowledges the 
failures of colonial discourse, for Said at times it seems as though they exist in a pristine 
state away from any blatant shortcomings. This may be a good account of how the 
colonial apparatus sees itself at any given moment, but is not sufficiently open to what 
Said would later call the “worldliness” of discourses. Ironically enough, we could say 
that Said does not yet sufficiently appreciate the Foucauldian maxim that “where there is 
power, there is resistance” (95) for he for the most part ignores the ways in which 
Western meaning production for the Middle East were contested from the beginning. 
Said already agrees with Fanon that Europe has covered the colonized in words, but his 
account needs to be expanded in relation to the human beings struggling behind and 
against those words. 
Said was attentive to many of the criticisms of Orientalism in this regard, and in 
his Culture and Imperialism he moves much more radically in the direction of 
representing resistance to colonialism as well. His attention to the specificities of 
anticolonial struggle is part of his nuanced treatment of anticolonial nationalisms, a 
treatment which is not only analogous to our large discussion of an anticolonial 
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humanism, but opens up important space for that to happen. In his introduction to Culture 
and Imperialism, Said says that he is aware of some of the shortcomings of his earlier 
work, and specifically that what he “left out of Orientalism was that response to Western 
dominance which culminated in the great decolonization all across the Third World” 
(xii), or in other words, he left out the agency of the colonized and the influence it had in 
resisting the structures of coloniality. The importance of resistant agency comes to play in 
Said’s account of how different modes of nationalism are genealogically related to their 
European predecessors, yet radically different because undertaken in a far different 
context. He says that “Debates today about Third World nationalism have been 
increasing in volume and interest, not least because to many scholars and observers in the 
West, this reappearance of nationalism revived several anachronistic attitudes” (216), 
which, for one thing, implicitly repeats the colonial stereotype that European countries 
exist in the modern sphere of linear time, and that others exist either at an earlier stage on 
that teleology or have yet to become “historical” at all. This is the very kind of suspicion 
that Said and Fanon’s modes of humanism are met with. Namely, that the appropriation 
of this term is considered to violate some sort of non-Western essence on their part. Said 
continues, saying that some of those that are uncomfortable with these new forms of 
nationalism “consider [it] as a form of political behavior that has been gradually 
superseded by new15 transnational realities of modern economies, electronic 
                                                
 
15 Said’s account of the critics who see nationalism as having been superseded by 
“new transnational realities” is a good point to address the criticisms of Said, Bhabha, 
and postcolonial theorizing in general as articulated by Hardt and Negri in their hugely 
influential and controversial Empire. Their argument is that the axes of power and 
difference inaugurated by colonial violence have been completely superseded by global 
capitalism, and that theorists like Said and Bhabha who focus on the colonial difference 
perpetuate a manner of fighting against empire which has become hopelessly  
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communications, and superpower military projection”(216), and that therefore, it is a 
term and organizational principle that has become outmoded and unable to deal with the 
complexities of the contemporary world. Said criticizes these views, however, and 
suggests that in all of them “there is a marked (and, in my opinion, ahistorical) 
discomfort with non-Western societies acquiring national independence, which is 
believed to be ‘foreign’ to their ethos” (216). That colonized peoples were forced to 
adopt and adapt to Western structures is admitted by these critics, yet that nationalism 
could mean something new in the new anticolonial context seems to be lost on them. 
Ironically, in trying to relegate nationalism to a purely historical register, those who stress 
the rigid importance of history are in fact shutting off their historical narratives from 
actual political and social dynamics. Only historical knowledge that is sensitive to the 
realities of anticolonial struggle is adequate as knowledge in the first place.  
                                                
 
anachronistic. Indeed, according to Hardt and Negri, Bhabha and Said’s usefulness as 
theorists is purely historical. What they have obviously missed is not only that capitalism  
itself has its roots in colonialism, but that the shift from colonialism to neocolonialism 
contains explanatory depth that would greatly expand and nuance their own account of  
the global empire of capital. Hardt and Negri focus on the economic aspects of the 
modern geopolitical world to the detriment of the political. Certainly, the globe is chained 
to the vicious circulation of capital, but it is specifically the Middle-East geographically 
speaking that is currently being bombed and droned by the Western powers, not the space 
of the imperial metropolis. And at the center of empire in the United States, it is 
indigenous and poor communities of color that are constantly terrorized by violence from 
the police state and the prison industrial complex, not the property-owning white 
population that more closely adheres to the abstraction that is colonial Man. In placing 
humanity as a whole as equally under the grid of capitalist exploitation, Hardt and Negri 
ironically theorize in a way quite similar to those aspects of Bhabha that I criticize above, 
and in their attempts at locating the violence of economic imperialism repeat its gesture 
of reducing humanity to simplistic discourse. This does not completely vitiate the value 
of their work, but part of the problem is that they do not see the roots of the perpetuation 




Said’s contextual and deeply historical version of humanism defines the human as 
liminally situated and always within history in a way that helps emphasize and strengthen 
the epistemological edge of Fanonian humanism when synthesized with it. R. 
Radhakrishnan’s16 discussion of Said’s humanism in his “Edward Said and the Politics of 
Secular Humanism” is immensely helpful in situating Said’s account of humanism within 
the different theoretical currents to which it is related. The in-betweenness of Saidean 
humanism in terms of departmental discourses is an analogous entryway into the 
ontological and epistemological in-betweenness that that very humanism posits, for Said 
is always up front about how he is talking about a mode of doing work in the humanities 
that resists the antihumanist currents of much critical theory, yet is not subsumed into 
traditionalist ideology. An essential aspect of Saidean humanism is his concept of 
“worldliness,” that is, historically and socially engaged theorizing. Said  
[N]ever claims that worldliness is graspable in a direct or unmediated way, either 
in the name of political rectitude or of epistemological rigor. He is too much of a 
                                                
 
16 Even with the appreciative reading that Radhakrishnan gives of Said’s 
humanism, from the Wynter-Fanonian perspective, he still misses much of the central 
importance of Said’s gestures towards a more radical account of human ontology. From 
this perspective, it is certainly neither banal nor tautological (156) that the realm of 
historicity is opened up to the agency of the human. Radhakrishnan here repeats the same 
mistake that Bhabha makes in terms of seeing a radical appropriation of humanism as 
“banal”. Even within the context of the chapter, it is puzzling that Radhakrishnan could 
be so dismissive of this argument when he has spent so much time discussing an 
antihumanism that accepts as one of its central tenets that human agency as such is 
indeed not a causal agent in the creation of history. To even speak of history in creative 
terms cuts against the way it is understood on a broader poststructuralist level. Indeed, the 
obviousness falls away when we consider that it is not positioned as a regress from 
poststructuralism but rather a going beyond what it has established. Against a putatively 
universalist colonial discourse on Man that placed the colonized as nonagential passive 
recipients of history, Said’s antiEurocentric humanism opens up space to think through 
the potential of history told against colonization, of a fluid definition of the human that 
thinks of humanity in more liberatory and organic terms.     
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nuanced aesthete of language to allow that: instead he renders language 
accountable to the outside. (131)  
 Against the possible poststructuralist critique that Said has merely reified a pre-
theoretical access to the socio-historical world, he in fact never posits his humanistic 
approach as extricable from the web of language, but nevertheless maintains that 
immediate concerns of the political must always be brought to bear on the process. This 
approach earned Said the criticism of both the classic humanists in the tradition of Erich 
Auerbach and Matthew Arnold, the “pure theorists” like de Man, and a slew of political 
thinkers who felt his maintenance of humanism at all was a dangerous holdover from 
colonial thinking (132). Recognizing that humanism has indeed been a great force for 
colonial violence throughout history, Said nevertheless appropriates the term as “an 
omnihistorical state of being human that responds to worldly situations in the name of 
freedom and justice” (139).17 Later, Radhakrishnan mentions the 
Saidian possibility of existing simultaneously in multiples worlds, of experiencing 
windows as mirrors and mirrors as windows, of perennially transcribing any 
inside space of the outside, and of dwelling in many betweens as homes and as 
locations. (154-155)  
This possibility once again is predicated upon not reifying existing academic narratives of 
truth production, which is a 
[R]econfiguration of the term, since now the value of humanism is not inherent in 
disciplinarity or in the specialized discourse of the profession. Humanism is an 
                                                
 
17 This of course isn’t necessarily at odds with some strains of poststructuralism 
and even reminds one quite a bit of the later Derrida, working within the tradition of 
Western metaphysics in order to argue for the importance of a democracy always to come 
on the future horizon, and that such thought depends upon the undeconstructability of 
justice that must always inform deconstructive readings. For a reading of Said that places 
his work as a radical continuation of the poststructuralist project, cf. The Legacy of 
Edward W. Said, by William V. Spanos. 
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ethico-political stance that tells the intellectual from without how to handle, use, 
and direct the discourse. (155)  
Thus, Saidian humanism valorizes and opens up space for the human agent behind the 
grids of knowledge, pointing towards how these knowledges can and should be 
appropriated for existentially valid human contexts.  Part of the truth of the non-
reduciblity of the human to knowledge discourses is that this openness allows for the 
“secular production of new truths, values, and realities” in a manner that is not frozen as a 
mere repetition of what had always already existed (173).  Said’s project is to 
“decolonize humanism as Eurocentric fetish” to help think “the potential multeity of 
humanism: its internally heterogenous interrelatedness” (179). While this may seem to be 
purely relegated to the realm of scholarly methodology and therefore to be at odds with 
Fanon’s more political humanism, because it is methodologically and ontologically open, 
not only can Saidean humanism be opened to and combined with Fanon’s in order to 
politicize it, but in Said’s formulation itself, we are dealing not merely with an academic 
discourse but rather with a method of approaching knowing and being in the world in 
general. As becomes more evident in comparing his work with Wynter’s, Said’s 
anticolonial humanism resists its Eurocentric genealogy in order to open up space for the 
human as dynamic and multiple.  
Both Said and Wynter respond to the thought of Césaire in ways that map out and 
enunciate the contours of an anticolonial humanism in action. Following Césaire’s call 
for an “invention of new souls” beyond the provincialist and exclusivist histories and 
narratives of the human that colonialism imposes, Said posits a humanism that 
methodologically refuses closure and also refuses to see human identity as essentially 
stable and closed off either (312, 315). Likewise, Wynter points to Césaire’s argument 
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that scientific knowledge is “poor and half-starved” in the sense of not being able to 
capture the uniqueness and irreducibility of human experience, and that therefore, a 
“science of the word” is needed that is sensitive to the existential and interpretive 
vicissitudes of human being in the world (Wynter 64). Both of these accounts strike out 
against the “decadent science” (Gordon 121) of colonial knowledges that remain trapped 
in narcissistic abstractions rather than relationality with other narratives and the 
contingencies of lived reality. Knowledge production in the humanities is an important 
space as long as it remains open, but for both thinkers, there can be no hierarchization of 
the academic world. This is why both Said and Wynter are not satisfied to relegate their 
work to any one stand of scholarly categorization, and also why both demand that 
knowledge production be open to the ontological and ethical elements of human life.  
Said says of an application of this kind of knowledge production that “This is the literal 
instance of Marx’s stipulated beginning of human history, and it gives...the dimension of 
a social community as actual as the history of a people”(281). It is the beginning of a 
truly human history in the sense that the human has finally begun to escape from the 
violent strictures of colonial Man. For Wynter, according to a contextually and humanly 
sensitive form of knowledge, “the human story/history becomes the collective 
story/history of these multiple forms of self-inscription or self-instituted genres, with 
each form/genre being adapted to its [ecological and geopolitical] situation,” and that 
furthermore, the purpose is to arrive at the point of self-reflexivity wherein we recognize 
the ways in which we are creating our definitions of the human even as we do so. As we 
gain that level of self-reflexivity the “new object of knowledge is that of our genres of 
being human, of the governing sociogenic principles in whose symbolically coded and 
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prescribed terms we inscript and thereby experience ourselves as an I and we” (Scott and 
Wynter, 206-207).  In other words, we see that epistemology and ontology work together 
in a hermeneutic circle in which we know that our very modes of articulating the human 
are isomorphic with our modes for bringing the human into being. The true beginnings of 
Fanonian humanism are the beginnings of a humanity that no longer thinks itself in terms 
of the violent colonial situation, but in terms of both being and knowledge thinks itself as 
tied to context in fluid and dynamic ways.
  
  
BY WAY OF CONCLUSION 
 Placing Fanon’s call for a new humanism in Wynter’s terms of knowledge 
discourses and the human, and bringing it to bear on the discourse analyses of Bhabha 
and Said, illustrates the ontological potential lying behind their own theorizing, but also 
gives greater content and extension to our idea of this new anticolonial humanism as 
well. This leads not to a denial of the importance of discourse, but rather the knowledge 
that within discourse lies the struggle for a new humanity. We can trace the contours of 
this anticolonial humanism working within discourse through some of Aimé Césaire’s 
work in Notebook of a Return to the Native Land, his attempt to come to terms with his 
own subjectivity and history in the face of the colonial reality that surrounded him and 
his home of Martinique. In one of the most striking lines in the poem, he paradoxically 
says “Pity for our omniscient and naïve conquerors!” (68)  which cuts to the core of the 
hollow and dead nature of colonial systems of knowing, but is even more striking 
because followed by the call to situate knowledge contextually in the declaration, “my 
eyes fixed on this town which I prophesy” inasmuch as he links his entryway into broader 
currents of his knowledge production to the local and what he himself can experience 
existentially. We are reminded that he is talking about an individual’s link to context and 
history, not a solipsistic inwardness, in the earlier lines when the narrator mocks the idea 
of a “beneficent inner revolution” that merely convinces the colonized to make peace 
with their own oppression (61). Thus, against the illegitimate universalizing of the
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contingent and provincial, Césaire’s account sets up a hermeneutic circle between a 
rigorous attention to context in order to work towards provisional modes of universal 
liberation.  Addressing his own being in a way that prefigures Fanon’s prayer to his body 
in Black Skin, White Masks, Césaire says “And above all, my body as well as my soul, 
beware of assuming the sterile attitude of a spectator, for life is not a spectacle, a sea of 
miseries is not a proscenium, a man screaming is not a dancing bear…” (44). Colonial 
systems of knowing cast the colonized under a screen of dead knowledge that obstructs 
the existential process of intersubjective empathy and imagination.  The linguistic and 
narrative human cannot be captured by the death-dealing and dead narratives of 
colonialism, but struggles against its contexts in a way that leads to new interpretations 
and new modes of meaning and existing.  
Our new understanding of discourse that does not ignore its own connectedness 
with relational-ontology bears the radical promise of Fanonian humanism. Against and 
beyond the ossified colonial history of passive colonized figures trapped in the larger 
structures of colonial knowledge, the human species carries on its struggle of reinventing 
itself through newly constructed narratives. As Césaire suggests in opposition to colonial 
knowledges and beings, “What can I do? One must begin somewhere. Begin what? The 
only thing in the world worth beginning: The End of the world of course” (55). The end 
of the world of which he speaks is the end of the colonial construction of Man that is not 
open to existence but is rather a dead web of abstractions. He says further on that he 
wishes to preserve an understanding of his identity as a black person, yet he has a 
“tyrannical love” that hopes to begin with the love of his own race in order to be able to 
have radical love for all races. Césaire suggests that acknowledging and working through 
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historical suffering can comprise the first steps towards the time when “the soil works for 
all” (70) and resources are equally distributed among all instead of violently hoarded for 
a few. Through his poetry, Césaire suggests that through a radical acceptance of the 
historical and spatial contingency of the lived black experience of an individual on 
Martinique, he can break through the ossified abstractions of colonialism towards a more 
human intersubjectivity that recognizes shared intimacies and hopes with humanity as a 
whole. The human as thought against and beyond the ongoing violent history of 
colonialism is a gesture towards that situated openness and open-ended contextualization 
that resists the enslavement of humans to human structures, but rather sees human 
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